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COMMENTS
Alimony, Property Settlement and Child Custody
Under the New Divorce Statutes:
No-fault is Not Enough
There is an increasingly strong movement today both within and without
the legal profession which seeks to reduce the hazards and pains of tradi-
tional adversary litigation. One aspect of this trend has been in the area of
automobile accident tort litigation with the move toward non-litigated, "no-
fault" settlement of injury and property damage claims., A similar trend
is to be found in the area of divorce law; the newer divorce statutes seek
to eliminate the litigious aspects of divorce grounded in the old "fault"
concept 2 and substitute a contractual approach which treats marriage as dis-
soluble at the wish of the two parties involved.8
A "pure" no-fault divorce statute typically permits divorce or dissolution
of the marriage when it can be shown that "irreconciliable differences [exist]
which have caused the . . .breakdown of the marriage."' 4  Such statutes
1. See, e.g., Symposium On No-fault Automobile Insurance, 21 CATHOLIC U.L.
REv. 259 (1972).
2. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-403 (1967) which requires that divorce be granted
in the District of Columbia only if one of several "grounds" can be shown by the
party seeking the divorce.
While the D.C. statute is somewhat typical of fault statutes, Professor Morris Plos-
cowe has estimated that at least forty-three different grounds for divorce exist in the
various United States jurisdictions. Ploscowe, The Truth About Divorce, 96, quoted in
PLOSCOWE & FREED, FAMmIY LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 144 (1963).
3. Virtually all no-fault divorce statutes take as their starting point a classic dic-
tum by then Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court:
In a divorce proceeding the court must consider not merely the rights and
wrongs of the parties . . . the public interest in the institution of mar-
riage . . .. [Wihen a marriage has failed and the family has ceased to be a
unit, the purposes of family life are no longer served and divorce will be
permitted. Public policy does not discourage divorce when the relations be-
tween husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of matrimony
have been destroyed.
DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 863-64, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506(1) (West 1970). California was the first state to im-
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have been enacted in six jurisdictions at the time of this writing: California,5
Colorado,0 Florida, 7 Iowa, s Michigan," Nebraska,'0 and Oregon." Addi-
tionally, a Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) has been promul-
gated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.'
2
In each of these statutes the traditional grounds to fault have been elimi-
nated and the common law defenses to divorce have been abolished. In
their place a "breakdown" test has usually been substituted which seeks to
determine the true status of a particular marriage rather than to cast blame
on either husband or wife for specific acts of marital misconduct.
No-fault divorce, in essence, is an attempt to eliminate the bitter acrimony
that is characteristic of many divorce actions by removing most of the ele-
ments of the adversary system from the proceedings and by eliminating the
concept of guilt which requires the finding of fault on the part of one party
and one party only. In theory the fault system is merely a single aspect of
the adversary system-a system that has considerable disadvantages not-
withstanding its durability. As one noted writer has pointed out:
[The adversary system] brings forth guile and concealment as
well as truth. It presupposes equality of opportunity, means and
skill; but these are seldom evenly matched. It often degenerates
into trial by combat with victory to the swift and strong rather
than to the party in the right. 1
3
Particularly with respect to divorce, most couples try to avoid a full
scale court battle and seek divorce on the most easily proved ground-in
most jurisdictions the ground of cruelty. 14 Often by the time couples ac-
tually seek divorce the arguments and viciousness are quite often over, and
they seek merely a judicial confirmation of what has long been reality. As
one trial judge put it: "they are in court because they have already had
plement "pure" no-fault divorce with the enactment of the Family Law Act of 1969,
Cal. Civ. Code § 4000-5138 (West Supp. 1969), which went into effect on January 1,
1970. For a good discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see Krom, Califor-
nia's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PACIFIC L.J. 156 (1970).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4000-5138 (West 1970).
6. COLO. REV. STAT. H§ 46-1-1 to 46-1-33 (Supp. 1971). Colorado has enacted
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act with minor changes. See note 12 infra.
7. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 61.
8. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 598.1 to .34 (West Supp. 1971).
9. Michigan Laws 1971, P.A. 75.
10. Nebraska Act (L.B. 820) (enacted July 6, 1972).
11. Oregon Laws 1971, ch. 280.
12. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act text is set out in its entirety in 5
FAMILY L.Q. 205 (1971). Hereinafter the UMDA will simply be cited by section
13. F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 (1965).
14. This includes both physical and mental cruelty. See P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 123 (1959). Jacobson also notes that in New Mexico, a state
which permits divorce on the ground of incompatibility, almost 90% of all divorces
are granted on this ground. Id. at 126.
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their fill of battling. They've argued and threatened and called names until
one or both decided they can't take it any longer."' 5
The real disputes in the typical divorce do not focus on whether grounds
exist or which defenses may be interposed. Rather, they involve collateral
issues, e.g., how much the wife is paid, who gets the house, and what hap-
pens to the kids. These three questions identify the most important col-
lateral aspects of divorce. They are, respectively, alimony, property settle-
ment and child custody. Child custody, as shown below, is fraught with
considerable non-legal and extrajudicial considerations. Alimony and prop-
erty settlement, on the other hand, are essentially financial transactions which
are more susceptible of a purely legal solution, and judges understandably
seem more at home balancing figures rather than the children's lives.
The no-fault divorce statutes have modified somewhat the collateral areas
as well as abolishing grounds and defenses. However, it has become abun-
dantly clear that much less legislative thought and effort has gone into those
areas than has gone into the basic reforms. This article is based on the
premise that the three collateral areas of divorce require as much or more
reform and have as much significance for the parties than do the abolished
grounds and defenses. To show this oversight each area has been inde-
pendently analyzed and the new modifications in each state have been dis-
cussed. The analysis reveals that these auxiliary matters have not received
all the attention they are properly due.
Alimony
The basic premise of the award of alimony to the wife grew out of an older
time and a much different society, one in which women did not work, could
not sustain themselves and unless married and supported by a husband, be-
came public burdens. 16 This concept has been transmuted into a much
abused mechanism by which courts grant or withhold alimony awards on
criteria other than pure need. Generally, the alimony award has rested in
the unfettered discretion of the trial court,'1 although some jurisdictions
15. Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses Out of the Trenches, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROn. 98, 102 (1953).
16. See the excellent discussion on the historical origins of alimony in CLARK,
LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 420-22 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]. Pro-
fessor Clark argues cogently that while alimony may have had some relevance in an
ecclesiastical setting when church courts awarded only limited (a mensa et thoro)
divorces and a husband's duty to support his wife thereby continued unabated, there is
much less justification today when absolute divorces are the rule and women are be-
coming increasingly self-sufficient. Id.
17. See, e.g., INDIANA STAT. ANN. § 3-1218 (1968). "The court shall fix the
amount of alimony . . . which, in his discretion he deems to be just and proper. .... "
1973]
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have barred awards of alimony to a husband entirely (even when he is the
innocent party and in need of support). 8 Further impinging on the trial
court's discretion are additional criteria often imposed either by statute or
appellate courts. These include the use of alimony as a punitive device for
the husband's wrongdoing,' 9 and the ability of the husband to pay.20
The Concept of Fault in Alimony Awards
Fault has long played a major role in alimony disputes. In many jurisdictions
there is an absolute bar to an alimony award to the wife when the divorce is
awarded to the husband.21 The common law rule prohibited an award to a
wife at fault in a divorce and many statutes reflect this persuasion. 22  More-
over, a few courts have forbidden or reduced alimony when the wife gets
the divorce "[but] . . . has engaged in serious marital misconduct. '2 3  This
rather harsh rule has often had severe consequences for women even in the
twentieth century and has recently been subject to some modification. In a
1960 Kentucky case, after conceding that the divorce was grounded solely
on the wife's "fault", the appellate court held that ". . . when the wife has
not been guilty of moral delinquency . . . the wife may be entitled to ali-
mony even though the divorce is rightly granted to the husband.
'24
A Louisiana appellate court devised a somewhat different modification
of the original rule by requiring that an award to the wife not be denied
solely on the basis of her misconduct unless the misconduct was "of a serious
18. When a statute does not expressly provide for alimony awards to the husband,
none may be granted. See the cases cited in 66 A.L.R.2d 880, 882 (1959); Comment,
Alimony for Men, 3 KAN. L. REv. 357 (1955) (listing those states which have enacted
statutes permitting alimony awards to either spouse). It would appear that the equal
rights amendment currently awaiting ratification which prohibits sex-based dis-
crimination would void alimony awards solely to wives.
19. In the South Carolina case of Graham v. Graham, 171 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. 1970),
the court awarded a sum of alimony and child support amounting to over 90 percent
of the husband's income. Cf. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 5 Wis. 2d 146, 92 N.W.2d 356
(1958); Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937).
20. While the husband's income would seem to be an inherent limitation on the
total award, some courts have seen fit to make awards significantly out of proportion
to the husband's current financial status if the court feels his lowered economic con-
dition has been brought about wilfully or through negligent management. See, e.g.,
Donigan v. Donigan, 208 Md. 511, 119 A.2d 430 (1956); Hawkins v. Hawkins,
187 Va. 595, 47 S.E.2d 436 (1948).
Other criteria which various courts have applied include: the ages and health of the
spouses, the length of the marriage, the standard of living, and "what the wife gave
up when she married the husband." CLARK, supra note 16, at 446.
21. See the cases collected at 34 A.L.R.2d 313, 321 (1954).
22. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8449
(1932): "If the bonds of matrimony be dissolved at the suit of the husband, the de-
fendant shall not be entitled to . . .alimony."
23. CLARK, supra note 16, at 446, citing 9 A.L.R.2d 1026 (1950).
24. Taylor v. Taylor, 331 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Ky. 1960).
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nature [and] . . . an independent contributory or proximate cause of the
separation rather than a justifiable or natural response to initial fault on the
part of the husband."'25  In DeBurgh v. DeBurgh,26 the California Supreme
Court held that when a divorce is granted to both parties (virtually abolish-
ing the defense of recrimination) alimony may be awarded to either party.
27
This system of spousal support has led to considerable injustice. Per-
haps the inequity arises from the problems caused by the trial courts' having
lost sight of the central purpose of alimony-to keep unemployable wives or
husbands from becoming public charges. The attitude that alimony should
be awarded in the nature of a punitive fine is absurd both from a sociologi-
cal and a legal sense. It is clear that such punishment has little or no de-
terrent effect on the divorcing spouse; few couples abstain from divorce when
their marriage has broken down merely because of fear of an award of ali-
mony. "Fault" is not the moral equivalent of "guilt" since an act of marital
misconduct may be merely a sympton of a broken marriage and not the
cause of the breakdown. 28 But even if we may equate fault and guilt and
thus legitimately seek punishment of the errant spouse, the divorce itself
should constitute the punishment: that is, it should be sufficient that one is
driven out of a family environment-and thus out of the cultural main-
stream-in the same sense that political crimes are often punished by exile.
It is a senseless compounding of the tragedy to look to a collateral area
such as spousal support in search of further sanctions.
From a legal standpoint the concept of alimony as punishment is di-
rectly contradicted by those statutes which require the cessation of alimony
payments upon the remarriage of the spouse. 29  If truly punitive there is no
reason to cease payments because of a change in a spouse's circumstances.
5 0
25. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 236 La. 40, 106 So. 2d 707, 709 (1958).
26. 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
27. Id. at 862, 250 P.2d at 602. The defense of recrimination prohibits award of a
divorce to one spouse based on the other spouse's fault when the first spouse has also
engaged in conduct which constitutes grounds for divorce.
28. See Walker, Disarming the Litigious Man: A Glance at Fault and California's
New Divorce Legislation, 1 PACIFIC L.J. 182, 191-94 (1970). In a later article Pro-
fessor Walker argues that the fault system in general leads to a pattern of "law-
avoidance" rather than "law abidingness" on the part of troubled couples. Walker,
Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in Response to Present Divorce
Laws, 10 J. FAMILY L. 267 (1971).
29. See, e.g., former COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-5(5) which requires termination of
the alimony payment upon the wife's remarriage unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties.
30. Professor Clark lists eight factors which influence modification of alimony
awards. These include: (i) wife's remarriage, (2) husband's remarriage, (3)
changes in the wife's needs, (4) changes in the husband's ability to pay, (5) hus-
band's death, (6) subsequent misconduct of wife, (7) violation of divorce decree by
husband or wife, and (8) post-decree agreement of the parties. CLARK, supra note 16
at 457-64.
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Thus, the present system of alimony is not in the least satisfactory. Its
function and purpose are often misconstrued; its premise is founded on an
outmoded view of society not comporting with contemporary American so-
ciety. One empirical study of alimony has noted that it is often used by di-
vorce lawyers more as a device to get negotiating leverage rather than as
an end in and of itself.8 ' Some judges, anxious to permit the ties between
spouses to be clearly severed (a rather healthy attitude, it would seem),
are reluctant to award alimony at all. As Hopson's study in the Kansas trial
courts noted:
Viewing alimony as a "cash" payment, the judges said that women
did not ask for it too often, and when they did the court was not
particularly receptive. . . . [One judge] said he doubted if he
granted alimony in more than one out of five cases where the wife
asked for it, and that usually she does not ask for it. Another said
that he did not like alimony and that a wife should not be "making
money" off a divorce. He added that since it is almost inpossible
to collect there is not much reason to grant it. He has granted ali-
mony in only twenty five cases in his twenty years as a judge.3
2
The New Statutory Reform
The new no-fault statutes have in general corrected only a few of the de-
ficiencies in the present system of alimony awards. The California Family
Law Act,8 3 the Colorado act,3 4 the Uniform Marriage and Divorce act,35 and
the Oregon statute36 bar evidence of misconduct from the courts' determina-
tion of spousal support. Florida, in a curious and seemingly inexplicable
anomaly, incorporated much of the previous statutory language (phrased
in fault terms) in its new law. The earlier Florida statute barred alimony
for an adulterous wife;8 7 the new statute permits the court to "consider" a
31. Hopson, The Economics of a Divorce: A Pilot Empirical Study at the Trial
Court Level, 11 KAN. L. REV. 107, 123 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Hopson].
32. Id. at 125.
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (West 1970). "In any pleadings or proceedings for
legal separation or dissolution of marriage . . . evidence of specific acts of misconduct
shall be improper and inadmissible ....
34. COLO. REV. STAT. 46-1-14(2)(a) (Supp. 1972). "The maintenance order shall
be in such amounts and for such periods of time as the court deems just, without re-
gard to marital misconduct. .. ."
35. UMDA § 308(b) (the language is the same as the Colorado act).
36. ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.036(2) (1971). "The court shall not receive evidence of
specific acts of misconduct. . . ." (with exceptions for child custody and to show irre-
concilable differences).
37. FLA. STAT. § 65.08 (1957) read, in part, as follows:
In every decree of divorce in a suit by the wife, the court shall make such
orders touching the maintenance, alimony and suit money of the wife . . . as
from the circumstances of the parties and nature of the case may be fit,
equitable and just; but nO alimony shall be granted to an adulterous wife.
[Vol. 22:365
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spouse's adultery in the award. 38
The remaining statutes do not specifically mention the exclusion of mis-
conduct evidence. It remains to be seen whether the lack of an express
prohibition will lead to an intrusion of fault evidence in subsequent pro-
ceedings. This appears entirely possible since the prerogatives of trial court
discretion have been retained and the matter of misconduct is not excluded
from the permissible factors relied on by the court.
Furthermore, the new statutes, with the exception of Colorado and the
UMDA,39 make no other modification of present procedures for awards.
There are no statutory guidelines or standards set out to guide alimony de-
termination at the trial level. Most statutes appear to permit almost un-
bridled judicial discretion. Iowa, for example, sets out its alimony provi-
sions in a single sentence, lumped with child custody and property divi-
sion: "When a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such
order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the
parties as shall be justified."'40  Even with the magnificent legislative his-
tory compiled for the California Family Law Act, Professor Clark notes that
the Governor's Commission "gave relatively little consideration to problems
of alimony and property."
'4 '
One of the criticisms most frequently directed toward alimony awards
is the lack of adequate judicial or statutory guidelines for the trial court.
As early as 1939 legal commentators were skeptical of the wide discretion
permitted trial courts.
42
Only the Colorado act and the UMDA provide judicial guidelines for
the exercise of trial court discretion in the area of alimony. First they pro-
hibit any maintenance award at all unless the spouse seeking support lacks
sufficient property (ideally property given him as part of the divorce settle-
38. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (Supp. 1971) reads, in part:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant ali-
mony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or perma-
nent in nature . . . The court may consider the adultery of a spouse
. . . in determining whether alimony shall be awarded to such spouse
and the amount of alimony if any, to be awarded to such spouse ...
39. See discussion in the text at notes 42-45, inIra.
40. IowA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
41. Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 403, 409
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Divorce Reform].
42. Cooey, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 213 (1939). Mr. Cooey remarked:
Judicial discretion is probably nowhere more intimately connected with human
relations, nor is it given freer rein, than in the field of domestic relations.
Particularly is this true when applied to the question of alimony.
1973]
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ment to "provide for his reasonable needs; ' '43 and unless custodianship of a
child or lack of employability bar him from seeking outside employment.
Second, the court is admonished to consider all "relevant factors" includ-
ing:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking support;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training
to enable the party to find employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and physical and mental condition of the spouse; and
(6) the ability of the paying spouse to meet his own needs.
44
Professor Clark scoffs at these guidelines and asserts that the limitations on
judicial discretion set out above are "more apparent than real" since the
factors a judge is to consider are already considered today by "most courts."1
45
Additionally, none of the statutes make any attempt to resolve the much
more vital problem of the source of funds to properly support the spouse
once alimony is awarded. In most cases a husband's income is barely
sufficient to meet the needs of a single, unseparated nuclear family. A di-
vorce frequently requires the husband to maintain himself in a separate resi-
dence as well as support his ex-wife and children. At the same time, in the
transitional period the husband is faced with moving expenses and large at-
torney's fees.
46
If the main purpose of alimony is to prevent one spouse from going on the
public dole, clearly more thought should be given to the problem of stretching
a single budget to fit two households. Professor Clark suggests that mari-
tal insurance be made available by which spouses may insure themselves
43. UMDA § 308(a)(1)-(2); COLO. REV. STAT. 46-1-14(1)(b)-(c) (Supp. 1971).
44. UMDA § 308(b)(1), (6); COLO. REV. STAT. 46-1-14(2)(b)-(g) (Supp. 1971).
The comments to the UMDA indicate:
The dual intention of this section and Section 307 [Property Division] is to
encourage the court to provide for the financial needs of the spouses by prop-
erty division rather than by an award of maintenance. Only if the available
property is insufficient for the purpose and if the spouse who seeks mainte-
nance is unable to secure employment appropriate to his skills and interests or
is occupied with child care may an award of maintenance be ordered.
Comment to § 308, UMDA, 5 FAMILY L.Q. at 234.
45. Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 411. Admittedly the UMDA standards
come very close to the "net need" approach advocated by many previous writers,
e.g., Hofstadter & Levittan, Alimony-A Reformulation, 7 J. FAMILY L. 51, 53 (1967);
Hofstadter & Herzog, Common Sense About Alimony, HARPER'S 68, 73 (May, 1958).
46. In Kansas in 1962 lawyers spoke of fees ranging from $150 upward to $1400
for one party to a contested divorce. A losing husband often gets stuck with both fees
and may, immediately after the divorce, find himself in considerable debt due solely to
the legal work involved in the action. Hopson, supra note 31, at 142-44.
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against a marital breakdown. 47  When a dissolution does occur a spouse
might then be able to look to the insurance company for payment of at least
part of his alimony payments.
Finally, none of the new statutes incorporates any good workable mech-
anism for ascertaining the true financial status of either of the parties. In
the past this often had to be litigated. Louis Nizer, for example, writes
of a famous divorce proceeding involving Billy Rose and Eleanor Holm ("The
war of the Roses") in which he was able to use a statement made by Rose to a
newspaper reporter as indicative both of Rose's wealth and of the Roses'
standard of living. 48  California has required the execution of a "confiden-
tial questionnaire," but the form itself is suitable only for counseling pur-
poses and not financial disclosures, and even then makes its use mandatory
only in the 13 California counties with established Conciliation Courts. 49
In order to apply the proper criteria in maintenance awards a court must be
able to decide on the basis of valid, up-to-date and thorough information.
No new no-fault statute has provided this.
Property Settlement
At common law, a married woman achieved a rather mystical legal posi-
tion upon her marriage. This status, called by Blackstone a "unity of per-
son" (with her husband) meant that for all legal purposes she ceased to
exist while her husband was alive. 50  Virtually all of her property whether
real or personal became the property of her husband. More recently, stat-
utes have been enacted which permit a married woman to own property in
her own right and to convey it as if unmarried. 5' However, while these
newer statutes are a significantly liberating device for married women, they
tend to complicate divorce proceedings. Courts now must try to distinguish
the man's property from that of the woman's; and to equitably divide that
portion owned jointly. This is clearly a difficult task under the best of cir-
cumstances; it is a monumental undertaking with parties who own large
amounts of property.
The matter is additionally complicated by the tendency of trial courts, noted
by Professor Clark, to blur the alimony-property distinction and to divide
the property under substantially the same criteria as they award alimony.5 2
47. Divorce Reform, supra note 41, at 412.
48. L. NiZER, My LIFE IN COURT 185-86 (1961).
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4505 (West 1970). See also Krom, California's Divorce
Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PACIFIc L.J. 156, 175 n.115 (1970).
50. CLARK, supra note 16, at 219 (quoting Blackstone).
51. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.07 (1972). "A married person may take, hold,
and dispose of property, real or personal, the same as if unmarried."
52. CLARK, supra note 16, at 450-51.
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Perhaps one reason this is done is ease of decision-making. Once having de-
vised a criteria for an alimony award a court may then simply transfer the
same standards to the property division. It spares the court from having to
look deeper to the true equitable ownership of the property.
Fault and the Community/Non-community Property Distinction
Two statutory patterns have evolved in this area in the United States. The
first group of statutes is largely confined to the western states with Spanish
influences; it denominates all property acquired during marriage as "com-
munity property"53 and generally contemplates an equal division upon di-
vorce. In non-community property states which have statutes permitting the
distribution of property following divorce, the concept of spousal property is
not so clearly defined.
54
One writer has characterized community property as akin to the accumu-
lation of property by a partnership; thus
• ..it makes no difference whether one contributes more energy
to the task with better material results than the other; nor does it
matter if one makes no contribution at all . . . . If the marriage
fails because of the [problems of] individuals composing it, own-
ership of the property is nevertheless fixed by the original articles
of marriage . . ..
This theory has not been strictly adhered to, however. In California, for ex-
ample, a community property state, under the old statute if the divorce de-
cree was granted on grounds of adultery, insanity, or extreme cruelty, the
court was empowered to divide the community property "as the court, from
all the facts of the case, and the condition of the parties may deem just."5 6
In the non-community property states the courts have shown ittle reluc-
tance to divide property on various bases including a consideration of the
fault of the parties. A study in Kansas revealed that many lawyers there
53. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-4, 5 (1953). "All property of the wife
owned by her before marriage and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest ...is
her separate property." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-1 (1953): "All other real and
personal property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife or both, is com-
munity property."
54. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1962): "... where the divorce is granted
to the wife [she] shall be entitled to one third of the husband's personal property
absolutely and one third of all the lands . . . seized. . . ." with IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-1227: "A divorce granted for misconduct of the husband shall entitle the wife to
the same rights . . . that she would have been entitled to by his death."
55. Daggett, Division of Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 225, 233 (1939).
56. CAL. CIv. CODE § 146 (West 1954). See Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456,
326 P.2d 332 (1958); In at least one California case, the California statute had been
used to award the entire community property to an innocent wife. Barham v. Bar-
ham, 33 Cal. 2d 416, 202 P.2d 289 (1949).
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used fault as part of their negotiation process in property settlement as well
as alimony awards. Professor Hopson surmised that "'fault' is thought of
as a factor in property division more often than it is the basis for ali-
mony." 0
7
While it is difficult to determine, on any kind of comparative basis, the
intrusion of fault into property settlements as opposed to alimony awards,
such a distinction need not be drawn in most cases since the line dividing
alimony and property division is quite blurred. Suffice it to say that fault
has been a factor in the division of property in both community and non-
community property states.
Property Division and the No-fault Statutes
Taking its lead from Professor Daggett's 1939 article on property division,
the most ambitious no-fault act, the UMDA, requires that a division of
property upon dissolution of marriage "be treated, as nearly as possible,
like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership." 58
The UMDA and the Colorado statute approach the problem from what might
be termed a "quasi-community property" approach. The first duty of the
court is to divide the property into "marital" and "non-marital" portions:
marital property being, with exceptions, "all property acquired by either
spouse subsequent to the marriage . . ... 59 Non-marital property is the
residuum-what is left over.
While the court is admonished to disregard marital misconduct, the prop-
erty division is divided as the court deems "just" after considering all "rele-
vant factors including"
(1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the mari-
tal property, including the contribution of a spouse as home-
maker;
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; and
(3) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
division of property is to become effective, including the de-
sirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of
any children.60
Thus, while the UMDA takes a community property approach to the prob-
lem by first dividing the property into marital and non-marital groups, it
57. Hopson, supra note 31, at 136. One judge who admitted considering fault in
splitting the property said in speaking of a specific case: "I'll give one-third to the
husband, he'll spend it on booze; I'll give two-thirds to the wife, she'll use it on the
children." Id. at 138.
58. Comments on the UMDA, 5 FAMILY L.Q. at 207.
59. UMDA § 307(b); COLO. REv. STAT. § 46-1-13(2)(a) (Supp. 1971).
60. UMDA § 307(a)(1)-(3); COLO REv. STAT. § 46-1-13(l)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1971).
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then modifies the "partnership" (equal division) splitol by permitting a
"just" determination on other grounds. The rationale given for this method
is that, as noted earlier, the division of property rather than spousal
maintenance should provide for the future financial well-being of the spouses.
To a large extent this is a thoroughly justified position since regular con-
tinuing payments retain bonds and connections that should be severed. An
early sociological comment on the nature of alimony noted that "[allimony
perpetutates, in most instances, a relationship passionately undesired and in
a way that continues and even increases former antagonisms.
'62
The remaining no-fault statutes appear to have other defects. The Ore-
gon statute expressly bars any consideration of fault in its section on property
division63 but without the UMDA's orientation away from a dependence on
alimony payments. California now appears to require a strict half and half
division of the community property without regard to fault.64 Iowa permits
the court to make whatever order regarding property it considers "justi-
fied." 65 None of the other three statutes, Michigan, Florida, or Nebraska,
contain any language either barring evidence of fault or modifying the ear-
lier property division rules.
Property Settlement in the Future
Property settlement, like alimony, has not received a great amount of at-
tention by the draftsmen of the new statutes. The most thoughtful and
well-written of the no-fault acts, the UMDA, is to a certain extent, an ex-
tension of comments made in a 1939 law review article. 66  The healthier
trend is toward a judicial outlook which seeks spousal maintenance by prop-
erty division rather than alimony. In this respect Colorado and the UMDA
are of higher quality than any of the other statutes. California, by apparently
requiring an equal division of the property seems to be continuing to look
toward alimony for future support of a spouse. Florida, Iowa, and Ne-
61. See Daggett, supra note 55, at 230.
62. Peele, Social and Psychological Effects of the Availability and the Granting of
Alimony on the Spouses, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 283 (1939).
63. ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.036 (1971): "In dividing, awarding and distributing the
real and personal property (or both) of the parties . . . the court shall not consider the
fault, if any, of either of the parties .... "
64. As noted earlier, California courts until 1970 were permitted to award more than
half of the community property to the innocent spouse if the spouse at fault had en-
gaged in either adultery or extreme cruelty. Eslinger v. Eslinger, 47 Cal. 62 (1873).
This doctrine survived intact until the 1970 Family Law Act. The new act disregards
conventional language such as "just" and "equitable" and instead requires: "The
court shall . . . divide the community property and quasi-community property of the
parties equally." CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1969).
65. IOWA CODE ANN.-§ 598.21 (Supp. 1971).
66. Daggett, supra note 55.
[Vol. 22:365
Alimony
braska have not even expressly prohibited evidence of misconduct in prop-
erty settlement disputes. Clearly, in the matter of property division one
should look to the UMDA and the Colorado act for future developments.
Child Custody
The most arousing and emotional collateral area of divorce is inevitably
the decision of custody of the children. Twenty years ago Judge Bernard
Botein remarked that "a judge agonizes more about reaching the right re-
sult in a contested custody issue than about any other type decision he ren-
ders."' 67  This is rightfully so since probably nowhere else must a judge as-
sume responsibility for a decision affecting the entire future of totally inno-
cent individuals. Custody decisions, unlike property settlement and alimony
payments, are not susceptible of the balance sheet method of conflict reso-
lution. Nor is it at all like criminal sentencing proceedings where judges may
draw on voluminous and meticulously prepared pre-sentencing reports to
imprison someone already adjudged guilty of a crime. Anna Freud observed
that a child of divorced parents often
acts like an employee of a bankrupt firm who has lost all confi-
dence in his principals and no longer therefore feels any pleasure
in his work. Thus the child in such circumstances stops work-
that is, his normal development is checked and he reacts to the ab-
normal situation in some abnormal way.68
Thus, the trial judge not only must make a decision with an overwhelm-
ing number of complications and interrelated factors, but he must also make
it without even the privilege of observing the child in a normal state. More-
over, the task is often complicated by his own prejudices and those of the
members of his appellate court. In a spectacular 1966 decision, the Iowa
Supreme Court denied a father custody of his child and awarded custody to
the child's two elderly maternal grandparents on the ground that the father,
an artist in San Francisco, lived a "bohemian" existence while the grand-
parents were more stable types living in a healthy rural environment. 69
Common Law and Pre No-Fault Developments
At common law the legitimate child was effectively the property of his fa-
ther.70 Generally, the father could be denied custody only when the child
67. B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952).
68. A. FREUD, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR TEACHERS 36 (1949).
69. Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
949 (1966).
70. See King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (K.B. 1804) and J. GOLDSTEIN
& J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAw 324-35 (1965).
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was in actual physical danger or the father was corrupted.7 1 Over the last
100 years this rule has been almost completely abrogated in the United
States by the development of various presumptions. For example, the Iowa
Supreme Court has adopted the presumption that a child of tender years is
normally better off in the custody of his mother.72 This presumption is
now quite often juxtaposed with the newer, more discretionary "best inter-
ests of the child" test. Judge Cardozo set out the test in Finlay v. Finlay7r
as:
The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction . . . does not proceed
upon the theory that the petitioner, whether father or mother, as
a cause of action against the other or indeed against any one. He
acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the
child . . . . He is not adjudicating a controversy between adver-
sary parties, to compose private differences. . . . Equity does
not concern itself with such disputes in their relation to the dis-
putants. Its concern is for the child.
74
The "best interests" test generally applies when the dispute is between the
two parents. It is replaced by a kind of "fitness" test with a presumption in
favor of the natural parent when the custody issue is between a natural
parent and a third party non-parent.
7 5
As in the other collateral areas of divorce, the concept of fault has been
consistently present. Fault, in this sense, is generalized fault of the same
type which provides grounds for divorce. Maryland, for example, has es-
tablished a rule of law which sets up a presumption of unfitness whenever
a mother has been found to have committed adultery apart from the issue of
whether the child was ever aware of the misconduct. 7 6 In Nebraska, an
adulterous mother is deemed unfit as a matter of law, again, regardless of
whether the child knew of the adultery.
77
Other fault grounds have also provided the rationale for a deprivation of
custody, although Foster and Freed have remarked that "since cruelty is
alleged as a matter of routine in matrimonial actions and custody disputes,
difficult problems of fact are often presented to the courts." s7 8 It is enough
to say that fault is often a factor in a custody decision, and many trial judges
71. Clark, supra note 16, at 584.
72. Bell v. Bell, 240 Iowa 934, 38 N.W.2d 658 (1949).
73. 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
74. Id. at 433-34, 148 N.E. at 626.
75. Foster and Freed, Child Custody, Part 1, 39 N.Y.U. L .REv. 423, 425
(1964).
76. See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960).
77. Beck v. Beck, 175 Neb. 108, 120 N.W.2d 585 (1963).
78. Foster & Freed, supra note 74, at 431.
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have not been sufficiently sensitive to exclude those aspects of misconduct
completely unrelated to the spouse's relationship with the child. 79
Disputes between Parents and Non-Parents
Early custody disputes between natural parents and what Professor Clark
calls "strangers"-a generic term meaning all others but the natural parent
-were disposed of on the basis of the doctrine of parental "right." The
doctrine was simply that natural parents had an almost unassailable right to
the custody of their own children and an overwhelming showing of lack of
parental fitness was required to persuade a court to hold otherwise.8 0  In a
more recent Colorado case, however, Root v. Allen,8' a father attempted to
get custody of a child he had seen for only one and a half hours in ten years
(at which time he had been introduced as a "friend of the family"). The
trial court awarded custody to the child's step-father (the man who had mar-
ried the natural mother, now dead, after her divorce from the natural father)
and indicated that the "parental right" idea had long since been aban-
doned and that courts may apply a "best interests" test even in disputes
between natural parents and third parties.8 2
Thus, the "best interests of the child" test seems to obtain in all custody
disputes regardless of the relationship of the parties themselves. The test
itself is a rather amorphous evaluation which requires the court to weigh a
large number of factors. Some of these factors as developed in a law review
note from an analysis of relevant appellate decisions are:
(1) the moral fitness of the competing parties;
(2) the comparative physical environments offered;
(3) the emotional ties of the child to the parties and of the parties to the
child;
(4) the age, sex, and health of the child; and
(5) the articulated preference of the child.83
These guidelines do not, of course, exist in a vacuum. They must inevi-
tably be evaluated, as divorce grounds were evaluated, against contempo-
rary psychological and sociological findings on the subject.
79. Clark lists other factors influencing a court's decision as: (1) the desire and
ability to care for the child, (2) the child's wishes and (3) the race, religion and social
views of the parties, and (4) any contract or agreement between parents. CLARK,
supra note 16, at 586-90.
80. In re Gibbons, 247 N.C. 273, 101 S.E.2d 16 (1957); Fox v. Fox, 210 S.W.2d
622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). ILL. RIV. STAT. ch. 3, § 132 (1961).
81. 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962).
82. Id. at 120-21.
83. Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
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The Psychology of Custody and Custody Disputes
As Anna Freud noted earlier, a child involved in a custody dispute is not
a normal child. Indeed, he may have been permanently affected by the con-
tinuing antagonisms of a couple on the verge of divorce over a long period
as well as being affected by the ultimate splitting of the family. Like any
other living organism a child has needs and generally will find these needs
best fulfilled within an intact nuclear family. The needs themselves vary
from simple ones such as food, clothing, shelter and, for infants, demon-
strated physical affection, to the more complex emotional and sociological
requirements of the adolescent.84
Furthermore, a child's needs include a relatively stable environment to
develop the "predictive capability with which he can learn to master inner
impulses and to relate them to the external world."85  An adolescent needs
a parent-figure as both an object of affection and as a sexual model; chil-
dren with unusual medical or psychological problems often have unique
needs of care and affection impossible to gratify outside a stable, more or
less conventional family relationship.86
Investigators have found that the breakdown of the family and the
resulting failure of need gratification within the family conclusively leads
to external conflicts and problems such as school failure, delinquency, and
various psychological, physiological, and emotional problems.
87
The "Psychological Best Interests of the Child" Test
What the psychological data suggest is a test for custody which Andrew
Watson has called the "psychological best interests of the child" test.88 This
test is defined generally as "an organizing concept which can relate and
integrate all relevant data in relation to custodial disputes."8 9
To implement this test Watson suggests as a minimum a thorough psycho-
logical examination of the child and of those adults who seek custody in the
context of the child's environment, which examination should be given great
weight by the court. To safeguard the child's interests, which are often antag-
onistic to those of his parents, he also advocates the independent represen-
84. See, e.g., L. DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (1962); A. FREUD, SAFEGUARD-
ING THE EMOTIONAL HEALTH OF OUR CHILDREN (1955).
85. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce,
21 SYRcuse, L. REV. 55, 71 (1969).
86. Id. at 72-73.
87. McDermott, Parental Divorce in Early Childhood, 124 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY
1424-32 (1968).
88. Watson, supra note 84, at 67. Dr. Watson indicates that the standard generally




tation of the child at the custody proceeding by a competent attorney ap-
pointed by the court if necessary. Watson recommends a speedy and con-
clusive decision which makes modification difficult if the party seeking mod-
ification cannot show actual injury to the child in his present situation. He
also favors the mandatory participation of all parties concerned in whatever
expert psychological or sociological evaluations are required.90
Additionally, the ultimate decision should not cut out the other parent en-
tirely. Dr. Watson observes:
No matter what type of parents the child has, sooner or later he
must see them in accurate perspective and eliminate whatever
fantasies he may have had about them. This may not be estab-
lised en vacuo and can only come about through continued and in-
tensive contact. Indeed, the loss of easy access to both parents
is one of the principal tragedies of the disrupted marriage .... 91
A good custody provision in a divorce statute should therefore attempt to
mitigate the problems set out above, should try to incorporate the "psycho-
logical best interests" test and should see that the court has the authority to
appoint a representative for the child completely independent of the counsel
secured by the contending parties.
Custody Mechanisms in the No-Fault Statutes
The no-fault custody mechanisms are generally poor. The new Michigan
statute makes no mention of the issue of child custody and the Nebraska act
simply incorporates without comment the "best interests" test.9 2 The Iowa
statute permits such custody decrees "as shall be justified," lumping the
problem with alimony and property settlement: the act also permits but
does not require the court to appoint an attorney to represent the child at the
dissolution proceedings. 93  Both the California and Oregon statutes bar evi-
dence of specific misconduct except as it bears on the question of the child's
health and well-being.94 Oregon incorporates the "best interests" test and
abolishes in express terms the traditional preference for the mother, but also
permits a curious examination of the "moral conduct" of the parties-a de-
vice which may permit courts to revert to the pre-no-fault standards of ex-
amining the parents' entire background for evidence of any misconduct, not
merely that conduct which touches the child. 95
90. Id. at 67-77.
91. Id. at 85.
92. Nebraska Act (L.B. 820) § 18 "... the court may include such orders in rela-
tion to any minor children ...as shall be justified. . . . Custody ...shall be de-
termined on the basis of their best interests."
93. IOWA CODE ANN. §H 598.13, 598.12 (Supp. 1971).
94. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (West 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.036(2) (1971).
95. ORE. Rv. STAT. § 107.105(1)(a) (1971). The court may decree:
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California establishes an "order of preference" for custody awards (hav-
ing included a provision giving weight to the child's wishes if he is "of suf-
ficient age") as follows:
(a) To either parent according to the best interests of the child,
but other things being equal, custody shall be given to the
mother if the child is of tender years;
(b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been
living in a wholesome and stable environment;
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suit-
able and able to provide adequate and proper care and guid-
ance for the child.98
Neither the California nor the Oregon statute provides personal legal rep-
resentation of the child at the custody proceeding. Neither comes even close
to implementing the "psychological best interests" test.
The UMDA and the Colorado act incorporate some unique and provoc-
ative provisions in their custody sections. In Section 401, the Uniform Act
distinguishes between a custody dispute brought by a parent (which may be
commenced separately or as a part of a dissolution proceeding) and a claim
by third persons. A third party, according to the comment, cannot bring
an action under the "best interests" test if a natural parent presently has
custody.97 Apparently, if a third party seeks custody as against a natural
parent, he must look to other statutes, perhaps those which impose crimi-
nal sanctions on delinquent parents, for judicial relief.
The UMDA also incorporates the best interests test by outlining five fac-
tors which the court must consider in determining custody; and, at the same
time, expressly abolishes any consideration of fault which "does not affect his
relationship to the child."98  Both the UMDA and the Colorado act permit
expert consultation, 9 interviews with the presiding judge in chambers, 100
For the future care and custody of the minor children of the marriage as it
may deem just and proper. In determining custody the court shall consider
the best interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties. No preference in custody shall be given to
the mother over the father for the sole reason that she is the mother.
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a)-(C) (West 1970).
97. UMDA § 401; COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-23(l)(c) (Supp. 1971).
98. UMDA § 402; COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-24 (Supp. 1971). The factors are:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interests;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
99. UMDA § 405; COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-27 (Supp. 1971).
100. UMDA § 404; COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-26 (Supp. 1971).
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and the appointment of counsel to represent the child.' 0 ' Visitation rights
by the parent not granted custody are retained, 10 2 and motions for custody
are not permitted within two years of an earlier motion, thus preserving
some finality. 10 3 Clearly, the UMDA best approximates Watson's psycho-
logical best interests test and appears to more adequately protect the child's
welfare than any of the other statutes examined.
Conclusions and Recommendations
While the no-fault divorce statutes have been a major breakthrough in family
law and have gone a long way toward revising the thinking in this area,
each of the statutes has defects which may create additional problems.
Four of the acts fail to expressly bar evidence of specific acts of misconduct
in both property settlement and alimony matters. Several fail to prohibit
evidence of misconduct in custody disputes which do not affect the child.
Moreover, the statutes, except for the UMDA, have not resolved the prop-
erty settlement alimony issue and presumable do not require that alimony
be a last resort in those situations in which spousal support is dictated. Only
the Uniform Act approaches the superior thinking of Watson's "psychologi-
cal best interests" test in custody disputes.
A more satisfactory statute might incorporate the following suggestions
in the area of alimony, property settlement, and custody.
1. Evidence of specific acts of misconduct should be barred from any
proceeding involving alimony or property settlement by express stat-
utory language. It is not enough that such evidence be prohibited by
implication.
2. Evidence of specific acts of misconduct should be prohibited in cus-
tody disputes unless the misconduct can be shown to be directly rele-
vant to the issue of the child's welfare.
3. By express statutory language or by commentary, the statute should
make clear that alimony is to be only a last-resort device to provide
spousal maintenance when the property division is not adequate.
4. Some form of marital insurance should be explored either through
private firms or by government program (akin perhaps to social se-
curity or medical insurance) to provide financial support upon disso-
lution of the marriage without forcing one spouse to attempt to sup-
port two households on a single salary.
101. UMDA § 310; CoLo. REV. STAT. § 46-1-16 (Supp. 1971).
102. UMDA § 407; COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-29 (Supp. 1971).
103. UMDA § 409(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 46-1-31(1) (Supp. 1971).
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5. A custody provision must be developed which not only incorporates
the older best interests test but also provides for counsel for the child,
a finality to the custody proceedings and expert analysis and recom-
mendations as to the child's welfare and environment.
Undoubtedly, the no-fault divorce statutes mark a significant advance in
family law thought; but our legislative draftsmen should not rest until the
new statutes reflect a substantial reform and reworking of those areas of
marital breakdown other than mere grounds and defenses.
William Fox
